

WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS

A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

~~Classification Canceled~~



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WHAT SOLDIERS THINK ABOUT CENSORSHIP

Most men are satisfied with mail censorship in their outfits
but some indicate room for improvement

Source: Study of a cross section of non-divisional enlisted men in the Pacific.

Nothing could be farther from peacetime American tradition than censorship of mail. For that reason, it might have been expected that the American soldier's love of privacy and freedom would tend to make him resentful of censorship.

The facts are, however, that most soldiers do not seem to be resentful of censorship *per se*; they are resentful only of what they consider *poor* or *unfair* censorship.

A study of a cross section of non-divisional enlisted men in the Pacific shows that almost two thirds of the men feel satisfied that censorship of mail in their outfits is "about right".

Question: "Do you think this is because the censorship rules and regulations are too strict, or because the censors in your outfit are too strict in the way they apply the regulations?" (Asked only of men who say censorship is "too strict.")

"Regulations from higher headquarters are too strict".	21%
"Our censors here are too strict in applying regulations".	43%
"Both the above are too strict"	27%
Undecided or no answer	9%
	100%

MORE SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS

An additional question was asked of the men in order to solicit any comments they had to make and to pin down any questions they might want cleared up about censorship.

"If you had a chance to talk with the chief censor at (your theater) headquarters are there any questions that you would like to ask him, or any complaints you would like to make?"

About three men in ten wrote something in reply to this question. Their comments covered a wide range of questions and complaints, with no one question or complaint getting an outstanding number of mentions. The comments fall roughly into the following groups:

1. "Why can't we tell where we are?"

Some men can't understand why certain information is prohibited from their letters and not from the letters of soldiers in other outfits. (For example, it may happen that a man in a permanent installation may tell his location but

QUESTION: "How do you feel about the censorship of mail in your outfit?"

PERCENT OF MEN SAYING. . .

...about right

64%

...too strict

33%

...not strict enough
or no answer

3%

The sizeable minority of men who feel censorship in their outfits is "too strict" deserve special attention, however. To find out just where these men place the blame for what they consider too much strictness of censorship, they were asked an additional question. Their answers are listed in the table at the top of the next column.

troops in transit at the same installation may not.) Typical comments:

"Why can't we tell where we are? The Japs know what islands the U.S. has troops on."

"Why can some tactical combat troops tell their locations and others can't?"

2. Complaints about photographs.

Some censors evidently tend to be more strict in their handling of photographs than others. Typical complaints:

"Why can't we send some pictures home? They have pictures of all the South Sea islands on the newstands at home."

"Why can't we take pictures of our tents and surroundings without showing any guns or equipment?"

3. "Why not treat all units alike?"

Some men seem to feel that their outfits are being unnecessarily restricted.

"Why are censor rules different in different outfits?"

"Why can non-combat outfits tell where they are and combat troops cannot?"

4. Complaints of violations of privacy by unit censor.

Any violation of the privacy of a soldier's mail cuts deep. Men tend to be especially bitter about this point.

"Is it customary to have your personal mail read aloud to other officers?"

"With the exception that censors (officers) make public, laugh, joke and criticize what is written, censorship is about right."

Note: The use of "blue envelopes" by which men can have their letters censored by the base censor rather than their own unit censor seems to be limited. Only one man in 50 reports having used them in the past month; others report difficulty in obtaining them. The

fact is that the remedy for soldiers' complaints about violation of their privacy rests largely with unit censoring officers. They can hold such complaints to a minimum by scrupulous secrecy on their part.

5. Complaints about "moral" censorship.

Some men resent their unit censors' deletion of profanity from their letters. They also resent having their censors advise them on what to write home.

"Can censors delete material on a purely moral basis?"

"Why must a letter be cut if the language is a little hard? A soldier is a little hardened himself."

"Most officers take it upon themselves to return the letter because of family or girl friend arguments. They then give you a lecture on how you should speak in your letters. . ."

6. Complaints that censorship is used as a basis for disciplinary measures.

The following comments are typical:

"If they cut something they punish us for it."

"Has an officer the right to give a man *extra duty* because he wrote something. . .?"

EFFECT OF ORIENTATION

While complaints such as the above are more or less bound to crop up, it has been found that men are less likely to make them if they have been well oriented on the reasons behind censorship regulations. Among men who say the regulations have been "very well" explained to them, only 23 per cent say censorship in their outfits is "too strict." This compares with 59 per cent who say it is "too strict" among men who say the regulations have been explained to them "not very well or not at all."

ATTITUDES TOWARD MALARIA CONTROL

**Most men stationed in fighting in malarial zones realize
the need for combatting the disease**

Source: Study of Infantry combat veterans in two Pacific divisions. Additional data from study of cross section of enlisted men in malarial zones most of whom have not seen combat.

Insofar as causing casualties is concerned, malaria has often been as vicious an enemy as the Japs in Pacific malarial zones. The prevention of malaria among troops in the Pacific is a problem of the utmost importance and urgency.

A study of infantrymen in two divisions which saw combat in Pacific malarial zones reveals that *fully 60 percent of the men in one division and 36 percent of the men in the second had been hospitalized for malaria and returned to duty.*

It must be noted, however, that these men had an abnormal amount of exposure in malarial zones and that therefore their malarial rate was far beyond the normal rate for most Pacific troops. In addition, they reached malarial zones *before malarial control measures had been perfected.* At the present time, malaria is claiming a much smaller per-

centage of victims--but the above high rates indicate what *can* happen when men do not take proper precautions.

Another study reveals that malaria hits large numbers of men who have not seen combat. Of a cross section of men in a malarial zone, most of whom have never been in battle, 22 per cent have had malaria and been returned to duty.

The bad effect of malaria is not limited to the fact that it puts men out of action. It seems also to reduce men's battle confidence. (See chart below). In addition, it tends to affect men's physical condition generally. Among the combat veterans studied who have been returned to duty after being hospitalized for malaria, 25% think they are still in "very poor" physical condition.


MALARIA PREVENTION

The Army's preventive malaria program is being well received by the men in malarial zones. By and large the men seem to realize the seriousness of the disease and to appreciate the preventive value of protective clothing, nets, sprays and repellents.

HOW MALARIAL EXPERIENCE AFFECTS MEN'S BATTLE CONFIDENCE

Percent of men in a Pacific combat division who say their self-confidence increases with battle experience. . .

AMONG MEN WHO WERE. . .



MALARIA

Asked: "How serious an illness do you think malaria usually is?" an overwhelming proportion of the men questioned indicate that they think the disease is serious.

Percent of men saying malaria is. . . .

...not very serious

5

...fairly serious

33%

...very serious

62%

Asked to rate malaria's seriousness by comparing it to other ailments and injuries, 83 per cent rate it more serious than a broken leg and 47 per cent say it is more serious than pneumonia.

Most of the men questioned seem to agree that the Army is handling malaria "about right", but there is a significant minority who think that the Army could do more about malaria control. A third of the men who have had malaria and a fourth of the men who have not say that the Army "should give more attention to malaria control than it is now doing." This is significant because it indicates that men realize that no matter how irksome malaria control can be, you can't have too much of it.

WHAT MEN KNOW ABOUT MALARIA CONTROL

To test their knowledge of malaria control, the men were given a "malaria information quiz." While a majority gave the correct answers to each of the questions asked, many reveal that they have been either poorly informed or misinformed on the subject.

For example, 9 per cent of those who had had malaria and 8 per cent of those who had not said that protective clothing, nets, sprays and repellants were of little help, that getting malaria was mostly a matter of luck.

A greater degree of misinformation is evident in men's answers to questions regarding atabrine -- the drug which the Army is using for the suppression of malaria.

Atabrine is no sure-fire cure-all. On the other hand it is effective if taken regularly because it will usually keep malaria from developing far enough to make a man sick. Men who think all they have to do to prevent malaria is to take atabrine regularly are, of course, inviting trouble. So, too, are the men who think atabrine is ineffective or that it has permanent, harmful effects.

A glance at the statements following shows that there are substantial percentages among the men in malarial zones who have each of the above misconceptions.

22% say that when atabrine is used it is less necessary to use other preventive measures. This answer, of course, is false.

50% answer incorrectly that taking atabrine regularly for more than a few weeks is likely to have bad effect on a man's health. The fact is that atabrine has no bad effect on men's health. Atabrine occasionally causes mild, temporary unpleasant effects but these soon disappear. Many men are obviously in need of more information about the harmlessness of atabrine. (For an official statement about atabrine as formulated by Tropical Disease Control authorities in the Surgeon General's office, see next page.)

This need for more information is echoed in men's answers to other questions about malaria. Asked, "If some men do not take proper precautions against malaria, what do you think is the main reason for this?", the men replied:

"They don't know enough about what they should do. **15%**

"They think they may get malaria anyway. **25%**

"They don't really care whether they get malaria or not". **21%**

"it is just too much bother to take proper precautions." **22%**

Miscellaneous or no answer. . . . **17%**
100%

In response to another question, roughly one man in five indicates that he would like the Army to give him more information about malaria.

Such information is needed for two main reasons: 1. to aid the men in staying well; 2. to combat the circulation of rumors about malaria.

Many of the men's misgivings about the use of atabrine arise from just such rumors. These rumors can be combated most successfully by one method: giving the men the straight dope.

FACTS ABOUT ATABRINE

(The following statement concerning atabrine is submitted by the Surgeon General's Office for the use of all officers concerned with the problems of orienting men on malaria prevention.)

"The first dose of atabrine taken by

a soldier occasionally may cause some gastro-intestinal irritation with symptoms varying from slight discomfort to vomiting, nausea and diarrhea. These symptoms are never serious and almost invariably soon disappear if the drug is continued. After a time, about half the men taking suppressive atabrine may show a yellow coloration of the skin. This simply represents the fact that atabrine, which is a dye, has been deposited in the skin tissues. It is no more harmful than a suntan, and disappears within a few weeks after the drug is discontinued.

"No ill effects whatever have been noted in large groups of men who have taken atabrine continuously for periods longer than a year. Examinations of internal organs have shown no signs of injury attributable to atabrine. The unfounded fear that atabrine might make a man impotent has been disproved by numerous observations and has no basis of fact whatsoever."

REHABILITATED SOLDIERS CAN MAKE GOOD

Evidence that men returned to active duty from Rehabilitation centers can make good in the Army if given a second chance is provided by the following study.

As a by-product of a morale survey in an Infantry division, the records of 112 Rehabilitation Center "grads" were examined. It was found that after 7 months of service in the division, only 11 of them had been sent back to prison and only 2 had been given Section 8's.

Of the 112, 47 got into no further trouble with Army law after being reassigned from the Centers. Of the 65 men who did get into trouble, 52 went AWOL and 13 committed other delinquencies. Thus 58 per cent became re-offenders and 42 per cent hewed strictly to the Army line. While this is a substantially worse record than the record of the division as a whole during the same period

(5 per cent offenders) the fact that 42 per cent kept their records clean shows that a significant percentage of men from Rehabilitation Centers are worth salvaging.

It should be noted that the small size of the sample involved (only 112 men) limits the generality of these findings. Regardless of their limitation, however, the figures show graphically what good commanding officers can accomplish even with inferior material. However, since this study was made in a single division, the results may not be typical.

Attention of all officers concerned with the AWOL problem is called to War Department Pamphlet No. 20-5, ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE. It outlines practical methods for reducing an outfit's AWOL rate and for dealing with the specific problems of men who go AWOL.

HOW OFFICERS COMBAT FEAR AMONG THEIR MEN

Combat veteran officers tell how they dealt
with the problem of fear in their command

The cost of lessons learned in battle is high. How best to employ the fighting resources of their men is a lesson that many of our officers have already learned the hard way -- in battle. This report tells what combat veteran officers from two fronts have learned about one of their most important leadership lessons -- combating fear among their men.

Source: Study of company-grade officers in two divisions from the Pacific and one division from the Mediterranean. Additional data from enlisted men in the same divisions.

Few soldiers who have ever been in battle deny that they have been afraid. That fear is common to nearly all combat soldiers is apparent from the following findings:

Only 1 per cent of a sample of riflemen who saw combat against the Germans in the Mediterranean say that battle was never frightening.

Only 1 per cent of a sample of veteran infantrymen who saw combat against the Japs in the Pacific say that battle was never frightening.

These findings emphasize that combating fear is a problem involving an officer's *whole* command. It is by no means limited to so-called "special cases" in his outfit.

The question arises: Can officers successfully combat fear among their men and if so, how?

The emphatic answer given by company-grade officers in two divisions which fought in the Pacific and company-grade officers in a division which fought in the Mediterranean is *yes*, something can be done about it. They *did* something about it. What they did is reported here in their own words.

SEVEN WAYS OF COMBATING FEAR


1. Giving men "the big picture"
2. Mobilizing men's will to fight
3. Taking all possible pre-battle and battle precautions
4. Reassuring the men before and during battle
5. Prayer
6. Getting men's minds off the dangers ahead
7. Leading by example

WHEN ARE MEN MOST AFRAID?

To maintain the fighting efficiency of his men, the officer must be prepared to combat fear whenever it arises in his command. The question of when men are most afraid thus becomes of paramount importance. As the bar graphs on the next page show, men are just as likely to be most afraid *before* battle as *during* battle. (The data are based on responses of a sample of infantrymen from a Pacific combat division.)

WHEN ARE MEN MOST AFRAID?

Question: "In general did you usually feel *more scared before* going into combat, *during* combat, or *after* combat?"



In the material presented below, no attempt has been made to list the "fear combating methods" officers employ in any special order. Some of the actions described were reported by many officers; others by only a few. However, all the methods reported are practical; they have been used and they have worked.

I. GIVING THE MEN "THE BIG PICTURE"

Since such a large percentage of men are most frightened *before* going into combat, it is essential that steps be taken to reduce fear at that time. Men who are frightened before battle are likely to let their imaginations get out of hand. Their fears are multiplied and the unknown dangers ahead are exaggerated out of all proportion.

The wise officer often can bring his men down to earth before they enter combat by giving them as much information as he can about their battle situation--"the big picture" as one officer put it. (As combat officers well know, they themselves frequently don't have this information, but when they do it should be given to the men.)

Here is what typical officers say about "giving men the big picture":

Explaining the situation

"...explanation of the 'big picture' so that things don't look as they are led to believe at all times."

"Before action I attempt to give them the available 'G-2'."

"Telling them the straight facts. Most of our soldiers are not babies."

Thorough discussion of the plan of action

"Let your men know exact orders and what they are to do. Confidence is high when all know exact plans."

"Showed them that things were planned and well organized."

"Talked over the operations and tried to show them how our plans and forces were superior to the enemy."

Assigning each man a mission

"Planning and organizing a good method of attack; letting everyone know just what they were expected to do, and giving everyone a definite job."

"Trying to make the situation clear to them and telling them just what had to be done and their part in it."

The enemy and how to meet him

"By giving them as much information on the enemy situation as was available."

"Orientation on enemy tactics and enemy philosophy of life."

"Explaining enemy weapons and how to dodge them."

The enemy is no "superman"

"By explaining the fact that the American soldier is just as tough as the enemy soldier and that the enemy are not supermen."

"Explained to them that the Jap was just a man and that a well placed bullet will certainly mean a dead Jap."

But, --

"There's no use 'trying to debunk' the enemy. He's a fighter and they know it."

"Men know what they're up against and that the enemy doesn't shoot cotton wads in their weapons."

We have many sources of strength

"Make sure your men know their weapons and what they can do with them."

"By explaining the fact that fear was a natural instinct but their training would give them the confidence necessary ...to see it through."

II. MOBILIZING MEN'S WILL TO FIGHT

Many officers say that men are less afraid in the anxious period before battle when officers call up their reserve of fighting motives and incentives. The officers quoted below speak of appeals to teamwork and cooperation, the sense of responsibility for the welfare of others, pride in outfit, hopes of success and hatred for the enemy.

We have something to fight for

"That their wives, sweethearts, etc., are depending and waiting on them. Mostly appealing to their hearts."

"Make them feel that the particular small piece of the war in front of you is something you and they will win. It's up to you and your men."

But, --

"...be wary of 'flag waving' pep talks."

"We're all in it together."

"I knew they were well trained for the job and wouldn't let themselves or outfit or the folks at home down. I stressed teamwork and loyalty."

"...re-emphasize the fact that we're all in it together and fight as a team."

Pride in outfit

"How we all had been together for a long time and would get through this again."

"I remind them of our past record which is good and that we want to keep it that way."

Faith in your men

"Showing them I had confidence in them and respected their opinions."

"...there must never be any question in your mind that they will not do their jobs."

Hatred for the enemy

"To relate to them experiences of the enemy and instill in them a hatred for the enemy. Hatred and revenge cancels fear."

"...a brief talk about the Nazi bastards."

"Knowing that the Jap is an animal to be ferretted out and killed. Anger helps a lot -- though only temporary feeling."

Promises help -- if they are true

"Talking quietly of what the fight was for, -- a chance to do a job then return to the rest area."

But -- the false promise will backfire. Here are some that had a bad effect:

"Telling them we'll be able to finish the job in a few days."

"Telling them they'd have a rest in a civilized place after this one scrap was over."

III. TAKING ALL POSSIBLE PRE-BATTLE AND BATTLE PRECAUTIONS

Fear is often anticipation of danger. Evidence of well-planned preparations to meet and defeat the enemy makes the danger of battle less frightening.

"See that they had all the necessary equipment available -- before battle."

"Constantly checking the safety of the men and materiel (foxholes, camouflage); calling the roll of each section and installation."

"Made sure men had necessary rations, water, ammunition and equipment."

"Check flanks for security."

IV. REASSURING THE MEN BEFORE AND DURING BATTLE

Leadership in battle calls for a personal concern for the welfare of every soldier. The officer who really knows his men can give advice and encouragement to fit each man's need.

Personal encouragement.

"Moved among the men inquiring as to their feelings -- giving encouragement..."

"Have indicated that their coming out again was a very personal interest of mine."

"Compliment a man openly who has done a good job."

"Choosing the ones who appeared most shaky and having a long talk with them but not about them."

But, --

"...don't be oversympathetic and baby them."

"Don't beg them."

Fellowship

"Letting them know even if you are an officer you are still a human being and can understand their feelings."

"Spoke to them in a calm voice more as a friend and leader than as a 'boss'..."

"Shared my food and cigarettes with them. Helped some write letters."

But, fraternizing may go too far --

"I got too close to some of them personally - too much of a friend. Later they asked 'why' too much."

V. PRAYER

In moments of extreme stress, some men obtain reassurance and strength from prayer.

"A religious service and prayer by the Chaplain. When the men feel the presence of God and that regardless of the outcome God is with them they are less fearful."

"At first, I read my Testament in private; but later, I began reading it in plain view of everyone. I believe it led to a lot more of my men doing the same."

"Held short prayer meetings with those who desired to attend."

VI. GETTING MEN'S MINDS OFF THE DANGERS AHEAD

When the mission has been made clear and all the technical preparations for battle have been completed, when each man has prepared himself mentally for the job ahead and fully committed him-

self to it -- then it often pays to turn men's attention away from the dangers that face them.

Talking and story-telling

"Before combat -- talking about something else -- after you're sure that they know the job ahead of them."

"Talked about something pleasant -- unrelated to the war, or good news in relation to the war."

"Keep a good bull session going."

Laughing it off

"I joked with the natural comics in the battery and thus drew laughs and smiles from the rest. It's poor discipline in training, but it works in combat."

"Joked with them if possible. A guy can't be scared when he's laughing."

"We have some standing jokes in my company. 'Only one more fight and we'll rest'. It isn't much but it gets a laugh. 'Only one more hill and we'll be there'."

But, humor sometimes fails --

"Some men just won't be kidded. It doesn't help them a bit if you do."

"Don't joke about death or kicking the bucket."

"Forced humor fails."

Keeping busy

"If you are busy at your own work you don't have time to get scared."

"Keep them busy. Don't let them sit and brood."

VII. LEADING BY EXAMPLE

Veteran officers seem to be in strong agreement that when the time comes to take off, leaders must *lead*.

"American soldiers don't mind going places and doing things if their officers are there and lead."

"Lead off.. Get up *first*. You have to lead. You can not *drive*."

"By being out in front of them all the way on OP details, surveys, liaison work, etc. You can't be in the rear rank and do the job."

"I never give orders from a foxhole. If I am not afraid, neither are they."

"Under orders I tried to *drive* my men. It won't work. The only way for a leader to 'drive men', as we were ordered to do, is to *drive himself to lead* them better."

Stay with them; let them know you're there.

"...show that you are right there pitching in with them."

"...going around checking up personally after a shelling or periodically. Speaking to each man and talking with them."

"Never go off and leave them in a delicate situation."

Help them to help themselves

"If some individual gets very nervous - let him sleep in a foxhole with person of his own choice."

"Teaming them with an older man or a man in whom they had confidence and who would work hard."

Take your own share of the risks

"Do the first few dangerous tasks yourself. They want to believe you would do anything you might ask of them."

"Took the hardest myself and for the higher ranking noncoms."

"Every time you risk your neck for them, they'll risk theirs twice for you."

But, be careful in the risks you take --

"Any attempt at a reckless show of courage may be regarded by combat experienced troops as sheer foolishness."

"Remaining unconcerned about a dangerous situation may make the men feel they have a damn fool for an officer and increase their fright."

Your confidence is contagious

"Instill confidence by your confidence."

"Never rush -- be calm at all costs. Men will watch you like a hawk..."

"A show of confidence is just as contagious as panic if the men are receptive."

SOME METHODS OFTEN DO NOT WORK

Fear is stubborn and cannot be fought with fear. This judgment is echoed in the statements of many officers who warn against trying to bully or browbeat men into being courageous. The following remarks are typical:

"Criticism of fear only breeds fear."

"Ridicule or threats of punishment usually won't work."

And -- beyond a certain point, fear cannot be reasoned with:

"Attempting to talk reasonably to a hysterical man usually fails."

"There's no use trying to reason with men when they are panicky or shocked."

A FINAL NOTE

It is important to bear in mind that the suggestions made in this report cannot be acted on in a mechanical way. Those which will work well when employed by some officers may fail when employed by others. It is for each officer to determine just what he can do within the limits of his own situation.

FEAR SYMPTOMS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN IN TWO PACIFIC DIVISIONS

SYMPTOM	Percent of Officers and EM reporting each symptom "often" or "sometimes". . .	
Violent pounding of the heart...	Off	84%
	EM	86%
Sinking feeling in the stomach	Off	62%
	EM	78%
Cold sweat	Off	39%
	EM	58%
Shaking or trembling all over	Off	25%
	EM	56%
Feeling sick at the stomach	Off	29%
	EM	59%
Tense feeling in the stomach	Off	29%
	EM	59%
Feeling of weakness or feeling faint	Off	17%
	EM	51%
Vomiting	Off	2%
	EM	24%
Losing control of bowels	Off	2%
	EM	18%
Urinating in pants	Off	1%
	EM	10%

These enlisted men tend to report having more of the above symptoms in battle:

Infantrymen more than artillerymen

Privates and pfc's more than noncoms

Grade school men more than those with high school education or above.

SOME MORALE PROBLEMS OF ASF TROOPS

Job satisfaction and branch and company spirit are key factors in service troop morale

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted men in one ASF branch in continental U.S.

The morale of soldiers depends in large measure upon their attitudes toward various aspects of their Army experience. Because of the special composition and function of the ASF, certain aspects of Army experience take on added significance among ASF troops.

In a detailed study of an ASF branch, the following three factors were found to be among the most important affecting the morale of troops in the branch:

1. Job satisfaction
2. Branch spirit (pride in branch)
3. Company spirit (pride in outfit)

JOB SATISFACTION AND MORALE

Previous studies have indicated that job satisfaction is one of the most important factors in morale. This is especially true in the ASF because of the large percentage of ASF men who are holding down technical jobs. In the branch studied, for example, more than half the men spend most of their time doing the technical work for which they have been trained.

Among the factors which contribute to high job satisfaction are the following: 1. The feeling that one's time and skills are being utilized on the job; 2. The feeling that promotions -- which are the rewards for work well done -- are meted out fairly; 3. Help from officers; 4. The feeling that one's work is important.

ATTITUDES RELATED TO JOB SATISFACTION

UTILIZATION OF SKILLS

Percentage of men who say, "I use the technical training I got all the time."

...men with high job satisfaction **94%**

...men with low job satisfaction **12**

PROMOTIONS

Percentage of men who say, "My present assignment gives me a fair chance for promotion."

...men with high job satisfaction **83%**

...men with low job satisfaction **9**

HELP FROM OFFICERS

Percentage of men who say, "My officers do what they can to help me all the time."

...men with high job satisfaction **84%**

...men with low job satisfaction **10%**

FEELING THAT WORK IS IMPORTANT

Percentage of men who say, "My branch has one of the most important jobs in winning the war."

...men with high job satisfaction **88%**

...men with low job satisfaction **38%**

PRIDE IN BRANCH AND MORALE

No matter what his job, a man feels the need for recognition of the work he does. This need is felt strongly by men in the ASF because the importance of service troops to the war effort is often not as readily recognized as the importance of combat troops in the AAF or AGF.

Much can be done to build up the morale of ASF troops through increasing their pride in being in the ASF. Since many of these men are technicians, they can be best appealed to through their pride in the skills they utilize on the job. This research suggests the following four methods for building up men's pride in the ASF. (How these factors are related to men's feeling of pride in their ASF branch is graphically illustrated in the column at the right.)

1. *Increasing, wherever possible, the amount of training they receive.* In the branch studied, it was found that the more training men have in the work of the branch, the more likely they are to have high pride in the branch.

2. *Orientation talks by officers on the mission of the branch.* Men who have high pride in their own branch, are more likely to say that their officers have given them talks about the mission of the branch.

3. *Showing men that the ASF serves an important function in the war.* Men are most proud of their branch when they are convinced that the branch serves an important function which no other branch could do as well. ASF troops often need to be shown just how the service they render is invaluable to the men at the front and how the war could not be won without their efforts.

4. *Showing men that their own work is important.* The relationship between job satisfaction and men's feeling that their work is important has already been discussed. This feeling of "personal" importance is also related to men's pride in their own branch as a whole.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMOUNT OF TRAINING AND MEN'S PRIDE IN BRANCH

Percentage of men with high pride in their branch. . .

AMOUNT OF TRAINING

...none 29%

...3 months or less 38%

...over 3 months 42%

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORIENTATION TALKS AND MEN'S PRIDE IN BRANCH

Percentage of men who say their officers give talks on mission of branch

...men with high pride in branch 80%

...men with low pride in branch 59%

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELIEF BRANCH SERVES AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION AND MEN'S PRIDE IN BRANCH

Percentage of men who say their branch has one of the more important jobs in winning the war. . .

...men with high pride in branch 82%

...men with low pride in branch 55%

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEELING THAT THEIR WORK IS IMPORTANT AND MEN'S PRIDE IN BRANCH

Percentage of men who say their own job is very important in the war effort. . .

...men with high pride in branch 46%

...men with low pride in branch 16%

PRIDE IN OUTFIT AND MORALE

In many ASF outfits where men often work alone rather than in teams, pride in outfit is sometimes difficult to develop. Yet every effort should be made to develop it. Men's pride in outfit is a stimulus which often makes them work and fight harder, because they feel that whatever they do reflects on the reputation of their outfit.

Among the factors to which company spirit is related are the following:

1. Length of service in the company
2. Belief in importance of work being done
3. Zeal on the job
4. Certain conditions within the company

Percentage of men with high pride in outfit. . .

LENGTH OF SERVICE

...less than 6 months	12%
...6 months to 1 year	16%
...over 1 year	21%

The relationship between men's pride in outfit and belief that their branch has an important part in winning the war is revealed by the following:

PRIDE IN OUTFIT AND IMPORTANCE OF BRANCH

79% of the men with *high* pride in outfit believe their branch is important in winning the war.

47% of the men with *low* pride in outfit believe their branch is important in winning the war.

PRIDE IN OUTFIT AND ZEAL ON THE JOB

How zeal on the job is related to pride in outfit is shown by the fact that 55 percent of the men with *high* pride and only 27 percent of the men with *low* pride have high job zeal.

COMPANY CONDITIONS

An indication of how certain company conditions affect men's pride in outfit can be gained from the following findings:

Provision of sports facilities: Men with *high* pride in outfit are more likely to say sports facilities in their outfits are "satisfactory" than are men with *low* pride.

Opportunities for orientation: Orientation opportunities are more likely to be rated "satisfactory" in their outfits by men with *high* pride than by men with *low* pride.

Provision of recreation facilities: Men with *high* pride are more likely to rate recreational facilities "satisfactory" in their companies than are men with *low* pride.

LEADERSHIP IN THE ASF

Though the principles of effective leadership are universal throughout the Army, the very nature of the typical ASF command imposes certain special leadership responsibilities on the ASF officer.

The ASF officer whose primary job is to supervise the work of men who do the same technical job day after day finds himself in somewhat the same position as the civilian work manager. Thus, in addition to his need for other leadership qualities, he needs to develop certain special techniques in job supervision.

Leadership is, of course, a key factor in morale -- perhaps the most important of all factors. There is much the officer can do to improve the morale of his command through proper job supervision, orientation, and selection of personnel. Job satisfaction, pride in branch and outfit, and other components of morale hinge on such factors as these.

ATTITUDES TOWARD ROTATION

Many men seem misinformed about the problems
involved in getting home from overseas

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted men who have been in a Pacific combat zone for 18 months or more but have not seen combat.

The difficulties involved in working out an all-inclusive rotation policy among men stationed at distant overseas installations are apparent to most officers. Unfortunately, they do not seem to be nearly so apparent to the men themselves.

Non-divisional enlisted men who have not seen combat but who have been in a Pacific combat zone for 18 months or more were questioned about their attitudes toward rotation. Many of them express attitudes that are unrealistic in the light of the difficulties which dictate the Army's rotation policy. It seems likely that some of these men are not well informed about that policy and its limitations.

For example, three-fourths of them think that there is no reason why the Army could not send all the men home after two years overseas if it really wanted to.

This thought implies that many of the

men do not appreciate the shipping difficulties involved in bringing them home, nor the military necessity which dictates that large numbers of them be kept in the Pacific until Japan is defeated.

This same lack of realism is evident when 61 per cent of the men questioned agree with the following statement:

"A man who has been overseas for 18 months has done his full share in the war and deserves to go home."

Men's attitude toward rotation seem almost divorced from their attitudes toward the war in general. Even those men who say they "never" have doubts that the war is worth fighting tend to echo the same general sentiments toward rotation. For example, 74 per cent of them disagree with the statement: *"Even if I had a chance to go home now, I would still rather stay on the job until Japan is nearer defeat."*

It seems reasonable to suppose that once men are fully informed about the problems involved in getting them home, they will be somewhat less impatient with the rotation policy as it affects them.

ATTITUDES OF NON-DIVISIONAL EM IN THE PACIFIC TOWARD ROTATION


QUESTION: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"

PERCENT OF MEN SAYING THEY . . .

"Even if I had a chance to go home now, I would still rather stay here on the job until Japan is nearer defeat."

"The main job now is winning the war, and no man in good health has a RIGHT to go home until that job is done."

"Men talk a lot about going home, but most men would not want to go back until Japan is defeated."



MEN'S GENERAL SPIRITS AMONG AAF GROUND CREWS

Isolation and being far from home tend to
lower men's spirits overseas

Source: Study of cross sections of enlisted AAF personnel (mostly ground crew men) in two overseas theatres and in continental U.S.

Wherever they are, our men of the AAF ground crews seem to know the importance of the work they are doing. In a European theater against the Germans, in a Pacific theater against the Japs, at home in the U.S., these men who service planes appreciate the worthwhileness of their jobs.

Overseas combat service, which tends to increase job satisfaction among AAF ground crews, seems to have an opposite effect on their general good spirits, however. Whereas, the percentage of men in good spirits increases with length of service in the U.S., it decreases with length of service among AAF ground crew

men overseas. Three-fifths of the men in the U.S. with two years or more service say they are usually in good spirits. This percentage drops to one-third among men in an overseas temperate theater and to one-sixth among men in an overseas tropical theater.

Two factors probably contributing to this drop are isolation and being away from home. In addition, there is some indication that the tropics may have a debilitating effect on men's spirits.


In combating this problem, the recreation program of Special Services should be of particular importance. Also there is evidence that Commanding Officers need to make sure that their men are informed as to the military necessity of their remaining so long away from home.

HOW AAF GROUND CREW MEN IN THE U. S. AND OVERSEAS COMPARE ON TWO ATTITUDES

There is little difference in percentage of men who say their jobs are worthwhile

Percentage of men who say their jobs are worthwhile. . .


□ in Army 1-2 yrs.
▨ in Army 2 years or more



Men in the U.S. are more likely to be in "good spirits" than men overseas

Percentage of men who say they are "usually in good spirits". . .

□ in Army 1-2 yrs.
▨ in Army 2 years or more



ORIENTATION, PSYCHIATRY AND COMMAND

The Surgeon General and the Director, Morale Services Division, concur in the following statement:

The Orientation Officer and the Medical Officer are staff officers, responsible to command for providing information, advice and assistance. Each provides a special knowledge of a special field. It is clear, however, that the problems of orientation and the problems of the mental health of troops cannot be separated completely.

This fact is dramatized in this issue of "What the Soldier Thinks." The article, "How Officers Combat Fear Among Their Men" is clearly a discussion of a command problem. But fear is also a matter of direct concern to the Psychiatrist and to the Orientation Officer.

Obviously, there are certain problems of command which can be solved most effectively by consultation and joint action on the part of unit Commanders, Medical Officers and Orientation Officers. The responsibility for decisions rests upon the Commander, of course, but the staff officers named can contribute invaluablely to the Commander's understanding of these particular problems.

"What the Soldier Thinks" provides a continuing flow of information on command problems and men's attitudes toward command practices. It also provides research findings on men's general opinions and desires. These over-all findings often need to be related to the specific problems of individual commands if they are to prove maximumly useful.

The Medical Officer and the Orientation Officer are in a most advantageous position to assist command in this task. Because of his direct and intimate contact with problem cases, the Medical Officer can evaluate for command the specific pressures which endanger morale in his unit. Once policy has been determined for dealing with these pressures and the problems rising out of them, the Orientation Officer can better organize his plans for discussion of these command problems. In this way, orientation and psychiatry can be mobilized to assist command in building and sustaining the kind of high morale without which no fighting force can function most effectively.

HOW THE STUDIES ARE MADE

The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch, Morale Services Division and the research units reporting to the commanding generals of the several theaters.

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired.
2. The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied.
3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.
4. The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.
5. The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.
6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. If the group is composed of enlisted men, the class leader is an enlisted man, and no officers are present during the session. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.
7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.